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Abstract—Modern computer threats are far more complicated
than those seen in the past. They are constantly evolving,
altering their appearance, perpetually changing disguise. Under
such circumstances, detecting known threats, a fortiori zero-day
attacks, requires new tools, which are able to capture the essence
of their behavior, rather than some fixed signatures.
In this work, we propose novel universal anomaly detection
algorithms, which are able to learn the normal behavior of
systems and alert for abnormalities, without any prior knowledge
on the system model, nor any knowledge on the characteristics
of the attack. The suggested method utilizes the Lempel-Ziv
universal compression algorithm in order to optimally give
probability assignments for normal behavior (during learning),
then estimate the likelihood of new data (during operation) and
classify it accordingly.
The suggested technique is generic, and can be applied to dif-
ferent scenarios. Indeed, we apply it to key problems in computer
security. The first is detecting Botnets Command and Control
(C&C) channels. A Botnet is a logical network of compromised
machines which are remotely controlled by an attacker using
a C&C infrastructure, in order to perform malicious activities.
We derive a detection algorithm based on timing data, which
can be collected without deep inspection, from open as well
as encrypted flows. We evaluate the algorithm on real-world
network traces, showing how a universal, low complexity C&C
identification system can be built, with high detection rates
and low false-alarm probabilities. Further applications include
malicious tools detection via system calls monitoring and data
leakage identification.
Index Terms—Computer Security; Anomaly Detection; Univer-
sal Compression; Probability Assignment; Individual Sequences;
Botnets; Command and Control Channels; Malicious Tools; Data
Leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER-ATTACKS are a disturbing security threat exist-ing today in communication- and computer-based sys-
tems. They affect a wide range of domains including elec-
tricity and water infrastructures, financial and capital markets,
medicine and healthcare, army, businesses, enterprises and
universities around the world. The majority of massive cyber-
attacks today are conducted by Botnets, including Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, spamming, fraud and iden-
tity theft, etc.
A Botnet is a logical network of compromised machines,
Bots, which are remotely controlled by a Botmaster using
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a Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure. The compro-
mised machines can be any collection of vulnerable hosts, e.g.
computers, mobile-phones or tablets. Infection is via infected
websites, file-sharing networks, email attachments, and more
(see infection tree analysis in [1]). Once a host is infected and
becomes a Bot, it is programmed to use a C&C channel for
further downloads and updates and awaits instructions from
the Botmaster. It updates its data and operates upon receiving
commands from the Botmaster (e.g., launch a DDoS attack).
The C&C channel plays a key role in a Botnet by operating
as the communication means within the network. The Botmas-
ter manages and controls its Bots using these C&C channels
in order to perform malicious activities on selected targets.
This way, the Bots act as a distributed attack platform on-
demand, coordinated by the Botmaster. However, due to the
fact that the C&C channels are the only way the Botmaster
can communicate with its Bots, they can be considered as the
weakest link of a Botnet, as blocking them, renders the Botnets
useless. Accordingly, a main objective is to identify and block
C&C activities before any real harm is caused.
In order to mask their activities and bypass defense mecha-
nisms such as firewalls, Botnets uses common communication
protocols as their C&C, including IRC [2], [3], HTTP [3],
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) [4], [5], [6] and DNS [7]. Recently, Botnets
also adopted social networks as the underlying C&C [8].
However, while it is tempting to develop protocol-specific
methods to detect Botnets, attackers constantly improve their
C&C infrastructures and develop new evasion capabilities,
including changing signatures of the C&C traffic, employing
encryption and obfuscation and using domain generation [9]
in order to deceive detection systems.
Current techniques for Botnet study and detection are based
on honeynets, signatures-based detection and anomaly detec-
tion models [10]. Honeynets act as traps in order to collect
information about Bots and study their behavior [11]. Once
the mechanism of the monitored Bots is exposed, it is possible
to design a designated detection and blocking mechanism.
Signature-based approaches rely on a signature database of
notorious Botnets that were previously learned. However,
signature-based techniques are prone to zero-day attacks and
require a constant update of the signatures database [10].
Anomaly-based detection techniques, on the other hand, aim
to detect anomalies in network traffic or system behaviour,
which may indicate the presence of malicious activities.
A basic assumption when using anomaly detection is that
attacks differ from normal behavior. Thus, traffic analysis is
used on both packet and flow levels, considering metrics such
as rate, volume, latency, response time and timestamps in
order to identify anomalous data. Indeed, anomaly detection
ar
X
iv
:1
50
8.
03
68
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
5 A
ug
 20
15
seems as a promising approach for Botnet detection since
it may detect new structures of attacks (zero-day attacks).
However, this may come at the cost of high false-alarm rates.
Moreover, to achieve good performance, one may require prior
knowledge, e.g., statistical assumptions on the normal data,
such as a Markov Model [5] or ARMA modeling [12].
Gu et al. proposed two anomaly-based detection systems,
BotSniffer [3] and BotMiner [13], based on traffic analysis.
The former was design for IRC- and HTTP-based Botnets,
while the latter was designed as protocol independent de-
tection, which requires no prior knowledge. However, both
systems rely on Deep Packet Inspection techniques, hence are
less suitable for on the fly analysis of large amounts of traffic.
AsSadhan et al. [14] suggested that a periodic behavior indi-
cates Botnet activity. Tegeler et al. [15] presented a detection
system, BotFinder, considering high-level statistical features
of C&C communication which were extracted from known
Botnets in a controlled environment, limiting the ability to
detect new types of attacks. Protocol specific systems were
given by Villamarn-Salomn and Brustoloni [7] for DNS traffic,
Chang and Daniels [4] for P2P Botnets topology and Strayer
et al. [2] using correlation of packet sizes and timing patterns
for IRC-based Botnets.
From classification-based point of view, Lu et al. [16] pre-
sented a classification scheme, BotCop, using a decision tree
statistical model to classify different types of applications. Yet,
BotCop applied payload signatures techniques. Este et al. [17]
and Mazzariello and Sansone [18] employed a Support Vector
Machine as a single-class classifier model which constructs
a statistical model based on a given training set in order to
distinguish between normal and malicious activities.
The suggested system does not rely on memoryless features
of the data, such as specific values or signatures. In contrast,
it builds a context tree for the learned data, hence, when a new
data sequence is tested, the order of values or events in it has
the main impact on the classification performance.
A. Our Contribution
We study the problem of detecting Botnets C&C channels.
We suggest a novel universal anomaly detection algorithm,
which uses no a-priori information about neither the Botnets
traffic patterns nor the normal behavior patterns, yet efficiently
learns the normal behavior in order to generate a statistical
model to which tested traffic can be compared.
Our classification model is based on the celebrated Lempel
Ziv algorithm, which is known as an optimal universal com-
pression algorithm and hence a preferable universal prediction
algorithm when applied to stationary and ergodic sources over
finite alphabets. Using the probability assignment induced by
the prediction algorithm, we rigorously define the statistical
model which represents the normal behavior, and offer a
mechanism to test new, unknown sequences, using this model.
Furthermore, we offer a new look on the way to use data in the
classification process, offering the context of the data sequence
as the key characteristic used in the classification.
We evaluate the model with real-world network traces,
when timing data is the main tested feature. This allows us
to be both protocol-independent and encryption-independent.
Moreover, it allows us to suggest a system which is immune
to various hiding techniques, especially when used with low-
level features of the data, such as timings or sizes. The results
clearly show that the suggested model is a favorable solution
for the problem at hand, with excellent results in terms of low
false alarm and high detection rates, yet with only moderate
(linear time) complexity and no deep packet inspection.
Finally, we note that the suggested scheme is applicable to
any sequence of behaviors, and not necessarily only timing
data. Hence, one can use it to test for anomalous application
behavior, anomalous communication patterns within an orga-
nization and outside it, etc.
A short conference version of this work appeared in [19].
The current paper includes algorithms and results for two
new applications, together with additional explanations and
discussions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives the required background material. Section III describes
the key concept of universal anomaly detection, with the
key application, Botnet Identification, as the main example.
Section IV gives the tests results for this case, using real
network traces. Section V gives two additional applications,
together with results on real data. Section VI discusses the
possible prevention strategies attackers can use against the
suggested system, and proves its robustness by arguing such
strategies would require huge amounts of data and massive
learning. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Classification refers to the problem of labeling unknown
(new) instances to the most appropriate class among a set of
(known) predefined classes. When the underlying probability
distributions for the classes {pi}Mi=1 are known, and we wish
to decide which generated a given sequence y, a decision rule
of the form iˆ = argmax1≤i≤Mpi(y) is optimal in the sense
of minimizing the probability of error. In unary-class classifi-
cation, however, information is available only on one type of
instances. The goal may be to either identify such instances,
or, in the case of anomaly detection, identify instances which
do not fit the ones learned from. Indeed, when only few, if any
at all, anomalous instances exist to learn from, yet instances
of normal behavior are available, one can build a behavioral
model based on the normal instances and classify any instance
deviating from that model as anomalous [20].
Thus, given the probability distribution of the normal data,
p(·), the optimal decision rule in terms of maximizing the
detection probability given a fixed false alarm probability (in
the Neyman-Pearson sense) is to compare p(y) to a threshold,
and decide that y is normal if p(y) is above the threshold and
anomalous otherwise. The threshold is determined according
to the required false alarm probability. In practice, the un-
derlying distribution which generates the normal sequences
is, of course, unknown. A reasonable approach in this case
is to estimate it using the previously observed sequences
and use the resulting estimate pˆ(·). Note, however, that the
estimation problem differs significantly if a statistical model
(e.g., i.i.d. or Markovian of a certain order) is given, if the only
knowledge is that the sequences are related to some stationary
and ergodic source, or, in the “worst” case, the data constitutes
of individual sequences, that is, deterministic sequences with
no pre-defined statistical model.
In this paper, we suggest an anomaly detection technique for
the most general case, where no underlying statistical model is
given. To do this, we build on the relation between prediction
of discrete sequences and lossless compression [21], in order
to use universal compression algorithms and their associated
probability assignment in the anomaly detection procedure.
A. Universal Probability Assignment
The Lempel Ziv algorithm [22], LZ78, is a universal
compression algorithm with a vanishing redundancy. Conse-
quently, it can also be used as an optimal universal prediction
algorithm [21], using the appropriate probability assignment.
The LZ78 algorithm is widely used in a variety of other
applications. In the context of classification, it was also used in
[23] for typist identification based on keyboard events and in
[24] for English text, music pieces and proteins classification.
For completeness, we briefly describe the compression method
and the associated probability assignment algorithm.
The LZ78 algorithm is a dictionary-based compression
method. For a given sequence of data symbols, a dictionary of
phrases parsed from that sequence is constructed based on the
incremental parsing process as follows. At the beginning the
dictionary is empty. Then, during each step of the algorithm,
the smallest prefix of consecutive data symbols not yet seen,
i.e., which does not exist in the dictionary, is parsed and added
to the dictionary. By that, each phrase is a unique phrase in
the dictionary, that may extend a previously seen phrase by
one symbol.
Given a sequence sn1 = (s1s2 . . . sn), a parsed phrase,
P , is the smallest prefix of consecutive data symbols that
has not been seen yet. This can also be considered as
suffix concatenation of symbol si (from the sequence) with
a previously seen phrase P ′ (from the dictionary), i.e.,
P = (P ′si). A dictionary, D, is a collection of all dis-
tinct phrases parsed from a given data sequencesn1 , i.e.,
D = {P1, P2, . . . , Pi, . . . Pn}. For example, the sequence
aabdbbacbbda is parsed as a|ab|d|b|ba|c|bb|da|.
A common representation of the dictionary is a rooted-tree
where each phrase in the dictionary is represented as a path
from the root to an internal node in the tree according to the
set of symbols the phrase consists of. In addition, leaf-nodes
are added as suffix for each phrase in the tree. A statistical
model can be defined for a given data sequences during the
construction of a phrase-tree [21], as described next.
At the beginning, an initial tree is constructed including
only a root node and k leaf-nodes as its children, where k
is the size of the alphabet. Then, for each new phrase parsed
from a sequence, the tree is traversed, starting from the root,
following the set of symbols the phrase consists of, and ending
at the appropriate leaf-node. Once a leaf-node is reached, the
tree is extended at this point by adding all the symbols from
the alphabet as immediate children nodes to that leaf, making
it an internal node. In order to define a statistical model, each
node in the tree, except for the root node, maintains a node
traversal counter, where each leaf-node’s counter is set to 1
and each internal node’s counter is equal to the sum of its
immediate children’s counters.
For a probability assignment, as all leaf-nodes’ counters
are set to 1, they are assumed uniformly distributed with a
probability 1/i, where i is the total number of leaf-nodes.
Each internal node’s probability is defined as the sum of
its immediate children’s probabilities, which also equals the
ratio between its counter and current i. For example, Figure 1
demonstrates the resulting statistical model for the sequence
“aabdbbacbbda”. Each node in the tree is represented by
the 3-tuple {symbol, counter, probability}. In addition, the
probability of an edge is defined by dividing the nodes’
probabilities. Note that the probabilities of edges connected
directly to the root are equal to the appropriate root-children’s
counter divided by the total number of leaf-nodes, i, at each
step of the algorithm. The probability of a phrase Pi ∈ D
is calculated by multiplying the probabilities of the edges
along the path defined by the symbols of Pi. Moreover,
note that for each phrase Pi there exist a specific node in
the tree whose probability represents the probability of that
phrase. For instance, from the example shown in Figure 1,
it can be seen that P (ba) = 1028 × 410 = 428 . Considering
a sequence S, if during the traversal a leaf-node is reached
before all the symbols of S are finished then the traversal
return to the root and continue until all the symbols of that
sequence are consumed [23]. For example, the probability of
the sequence “bdca” given the same statistical model above, is
defined as the following traversal probabilities multiplication:
Root→b→d→Root→c→a and is calculated as:
P (bdca|Maabdbbacbbda) = 10
28
× 1
10
× 4
28
× 1
4
=
1
784
.
This stems from the conditional probability Pˆ (st+1|st1), where
st+1 is the next symbol after the (sub-)sequence st1, which is
calculated as the ratio between the counter of symbol st+1
and the counter of symbol st. We consider st1 as the context
of st+1 at time t+ 1.
III. ANOMALY DETECTION VIA UNIVERSAL
PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENT
We now describe the building blocks of the anomaly detec-
tion system. Throughout, the system is described in the context
of detecting anomalies in network traffic. Thus, in our problem
domain, the data instances are discrete sequences of network
traces. However, as previously mentioned, the proposed system
is generic, and can easily be adapted to detect anomalies in any
discrete sequence of events, with the proper preprocessing. In
fact, two additional applications of the algorithms below are
given in Section V.
A. Preprocessing
A data sequence is defined as a series of events from
a flow between a specific client and a specific host. The
ith Network Event, denoted by ei,xy , is a data transaction
Fig. 1. An LZ78 Statistical Model for sequence “aabdbbacbbda”.
between client x and host y and is defined by the tuple
ei,xy = (ti, tti, csbi, scbi, x, y), where ti is the time event ei,xy
occurred; tti is the duration of event ei,xy; csbi and scbi are
the total number of bytes which were sent by client x to host
y and by host y to client x, respectively. A Network Flow,
denoted by fxy , is series of network events between client
x and host y sorted by their time of occurrence, ti. That is,
fxy = {e1,xy, e2,xy, . . . , en,xy}.
For actual learning and testing, it is not required to use
all features (fields) in the data. As shown in the experimental
results, good detection capabilities can be achieved even when
focusing on a single feature. For example, timing data can
be characterized by the difference between two consecutive
events of the same flow, denoted by Time-Difference (TD)
and defined by TDi,xy = ei+1,xy(ti+1)−ei,xy(ti). A different
perspective is the total time the event took, denoted by Time-
Taken (TT) and defined by TTi,xy = ei,xy(tti). Similarly, one
can focus only on sizes, e.g., Client-Server-Bytes (CSB) and
Server-Client-Bytes (SCB) and respectively define CSBi,xy =
ei,xy(csbi) and SCBi,xy = ei,xy(scbi).
Consequently, a single-feature data sequence is a serializa-
tion of one of the above features, e.g, with respect to Time-
Difference, a sequence/flow is defined as:
fxy,TD = {e2,xy(t2)− e1,xy(t1), e3,xy(t3)− e2,xy(t2),
. . . , en,xy(tn)− en−1,xy(tn−1)}.
The above procedure may result in a sequence over a very
large alphabet (as, for example, times are given with a very
high precision). To reduce the range of values, quantization
is performed. For k quantization levels, a set of k centroids
{c1, c2, c3, . . . , ck}, is used. The centroids are extracted from
the available data during the training phase. Clearly, the
number of centroids and the method for extracting them may
affect the overall results. However, as seen in the experiments
on real data, this fine-tuning is easily done during training.
B. Learning
The LZ78-based classification model is divided into a
learning phase and a testing phase, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Binary
Classification8–
Decision8Making
p{Tj1=P{Tj|MLZ781
Statistical8Model8–
MLZ78
Data8Processing:
Quantization8–8Qk{Si1
Training
Sequences
S={Sh…Sm………Sn}
LZ788Universal
Prediction
Algorithm
Data8Processing:
Quantization8–8Qk{Tj1
Sequence
Probability
Assignment8{SPA1
p(Tj)=P(Tj|MLZ78)
Testing
Sequences
T={Th…Tm………Tm}
Centroids {ch…8cm… …8ck}
Fig. 2. A Classification Model based on the LZ78 prediction algorithm
In the learning phase, an LZ78 statistical model is built based
on a given training set of discrete (quantized) sequences over
finite alphabet S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}, using the mechanism
explained in Section II-A. Of course, training is done only on
normal, benign traffic. In the testing phase, first, each testing
sequence is separately quantized using the same quantization
method and the same set of centroids {c1, c2, . . . , ck} which
were extracted in the learning phase. Then, the probability of
each suspected sequence (testing sequence) Tj from a given
testing set T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} is estimated based on the
constructed statistical model (during the learning phase) and
classified respective to a predefined threshold Tr. Specifically,
the probability of each testing sequence, p(Tj), is estimated
using sequential probability assignment given the LZ78 statis-
tical model built in the learning phase. Testing sequences for
which pˆ(Tj) is greater than or equal to Tr are classified as
normal (as they “fit” the model) while a lower than threshold
value is classified as anomalous.
Accordingly, the performance of the classifier is measured
by the false alarm and hit detection ratios, also known as
false positive rate (FPR) or Type 1 error and true positive rate
(TPR), respectively, and demonstrated by a ROC (Receiver
Operating Characteristic) curve. The false alarm ratio reflects
the number of negative instances incorrectly classified as
positive in proportion to the total number of negatives in
the test, whereas hit detection ratio measures the proportion
between the number of positive instances correctly classified
and the total number of positives in the test. The ROC curve
is generated with respect to a set of thresholds, in our case in
the range [minj(pˆ(Tj)),maxj(pˆ(Tj))], where each threshold
defines a specific confusion matrix and results in a specific
point in the graph.
Note that the above classification model can be updated,
either by extending the existing statistical model or rebuilding
it, with new (training) data sequences at any given time. This
can be applied once the overall performance get lower than
a given threshold for a configurable interval of time (and not
for each momentary decrease).
IV. BOTNETS IDENTIFICATION
The data set used contains high-level real-world network
traces provided by an Internet security company (in
order to maintain the confidentiality of the company’s
customers, the name of the company is withheld). The
data set consists of 3,714,238 client-server transactions,
taken during a time window of approximately 3 hours
in specific day in 2009. The whole data set is available at
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/13592090/Botnet2009.rar.
Each client, denoted by ‘cid’, may connect with several hosts
(web-servers), denoted by ‘hid’. On each transaction,
data is sent both by the client and the host. This defines
communication pairs CID HID. Each transaction is labeled
as either legal, denoted by ‘good’, for normal data traffic
generated by the client, or illegal transaction, denoted by
‘hostile’, that is Bots. Labeling was done by the security
company’s experts based on well-known black-lists. Note that
these labels are not used during the classification process.
They are used only in the validation phase. Table I exemplify
the structure of the data set. Note that each transaction
is represented by a single record in the data set, which
consists of the following fields: ‘time’, referring to the
time the transaction took place; ‘time-taken’, is the total
time the transaction took; ‘cs-bytes’ and ‘sc-bytes’ fields
represent the total bytes sent by the client/server(host) to the
server(host)/client during the transaction, respectively; ‘mime-
type’ denotes the Internet content type of the transaction,
such as: plain text, image, html page, application, etc.; ‘cat’
is the category of the transaction - ‘good’ or ‘hostile’; and
the ‘hid’ and ‘cid’ fields refer to the host-index (Internet
site, web-server) and client-index respectively. Again, to
protect the identity of the company’s customers, these indices
were given arbitrary. However, some malicious sites are
identified by their domain name, e.g., ‘hotsearchworld.com’
or ‘blitzkrieg88.bl.funpic.de’.
Processing of the data included serialization and feature
extraction: first, the given data set is split into set of flows
based on CID HID connections, as illustrated in Table I
with respect to flows 486 52 and 9 49 (marked in gray).
A ‘Flow’ is a sequence of related transactions of the same
communication pair CID HID sorted by time and with the
same label, either ‘good’ or ‘hostile’. In total, there are 19164
flows labeled as ‘good’ and only 65 ‘hostile’ flows (0.338%).
This indicates the imbalance of the data set where most of
the transactions are legal and only a small fraction is illegal.
However, this is characteristic of real network traffic behavior.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE FOR THE DATABASE STRUCTURE. EACH RECORD IN THE DATA
SET REPRESENT A DATA TRANSACTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC CLIENT AND
SPECIFIC HOST/SERVER.
time time-taken cs-bytes sc-bytes mime-type cat hid cid
05:52:37 40 803 360 image/gif good 49 9
05:52:37 74 734 277 text/html good 102 15
05:52:37 27 578 507 image/gif good 52 486
05:52:37 27 578 507 image/gif good 75526 486
05:52:37 25 655 4196 image/jpeg good 52 4
05:52:37 25 655 4196 image/jpeg good 75526 4
05:52:37 26 577 505 image/gif good 52 486
05:52:37 26 577 505 image/gif good 75526 486
05:52:37 31 624 960 image/gif good 52 6
05:52:37 31 624 960 image/gif good 75526 6
05:52:37 1 812 22672 application/octet-stream good 52 6
05:52:37 1 812 22672 application/octet-stream good 75526 6
05:52:37 30 707 4368 image/jpeg good 52 2
05:52:37 30 707 4368 image/jpeg good 75526 2
05:52:37 28 667 2639 image/jpeg good 52 4
05:52:37 28 667 2639 image/jpeg good 75526 4
05:52:37 180 434 1451 text/html;%20charset=iso-8859-1 hostile 3 6
05:52:37 34 710 4270 image/jpeg good 52 2
05:52:37 34 710 4270 image/jpeg good 75526 2
05:52:37 69 697 334 text/css good 49 9
Next, selected features are extracted from each transac-
tion, e.g., Time-Difference, Time-Taken, Server-Client-Bytes
and Client-Server-Bytes. After quantization, the resulting se-
quences are the discrete time, finite alphabet sequence on
which learning and testing was performed.
Note that flows from a single client may consist of both
‘good’ flows reflecting legitimate data traffic generated by the
client itself, as well as ‘hostile’ flows which are generated by
a Bot installed on the client. In contrast, a server (host) has
only flows with the same label, that is, if a host was labeled as
a C&C infrastructure than all its transactions are considered
malicious. The ‘Client’ and ‘Host’ definitions represented two
different perspectives of the data set. On the one hand one can
examine the events occurring in the network from the client
point of view, and on the other from the host point of view,
as will be shown in the following results.
A. Experiments
Several experiments were conducted using the above
datasets. Flows/sequences were randomly selected from the
datasets, from both ‘Client’ and ‘Host’ perspectives, and
divided equally between the training and the testing phases
(hence, ROCs are based only on newly seen data).
We first tested which single-feature achieves the best results.
The system was then optimized using this feature alone. The
best results, in terms of optimal threshold and ROC-AUC
(Area Under Curve), were achieved using the Time-Difference
(TD) representation of the data sequences along with the
‘Uniform’ quantization (several quantization algorithms were
tested). To better understand why TD was superior, consider a
legitimate web surfer compared to a hostile connection using
HTTP only as a C&C channel. While the surfer must have a
reasonable behavior in the time domain, affected by the times
required to read a page, the times required for the server to
respond, etc., a C&C channel may behave differently, without,
for example, a reasonable response time from the server as it
only collects data from the bots, and the “GET” messages are
used solely to transmit information. Due to space limitation,
we do not include the results for the inferior features, and
focus on the results under TD and uniform quantization.
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Fig. 3. Testing ‘Majority Vote Classification’ using TD feature and ‘Uniform’ quantization method by considering ‘Clients’ type of flows. Left: Receiver
Operating Curve; Right: Zoom in on the upper left corner. First, each testing sequence partitioned into several sets of subsequences, denoted as #Subseq in
the graph, and the decision made per set of subsequences, where better results achieved for higher subsequences definition.
Still, using TD, the optimal threshold for 100% detection
results in 11.75% false alarms. However, this is when only
a single, short sequence is tested. To further improve the
above results, a majority vote for several sequences within
the flow can be used. Each data segment is partitioned into
several subsequences of length 10. The classification is done
based on the majority of these subsequences’ estimations, as
either positive or negative, resulting in better classification
performance as the number of subsequences is higher. For
example, an AUC of 0.994 and false alarms rate of 2.32378%
are achieved using a threshold of 7.87557x10−12, as illustrated
in Figure 3. This is obtained at the cost of higher detection time
per data segment, of course, as using only one subsequence per
data segment the decision is made immediately, while using 9
subsequences causes delay.
The above results were obtained from a ‘Client’ point
of view by considering a semisupervised training. To ex-
amine the ‘Host’ point of view, and differentiate between
‘Semisupervised-Negative’, where one considers only normal
data sequences during training, ‘Semisupervised-Positive’,
taking into account only anomalies sequences during training,
and ‘Unsupervised’ where the training set consists of both
normal and few anomalous sequences as well, we refer the
reader to Figure 4. Clearly, trying to learn the anomalous
behavior fails (the red curve - AUC=0.219), as there are
only few samples, and C&C traffic may differ significantly
for new bots on which the system was not trained. The key
message to take from the figure is, however, that when learning
is done using noisy data, which includes some C&C traffic
besides the normal one, there is no significant degradation
in performance. That is, in ‘Unsupervised’ training mode,
the classifier achieves very good results despite the fact that
the underlying datasets used in the training phase contains
both normal and few anomalous sequences. ‘Semisupervised-
Negative’ achieves the best results of AUC=0.998. Note that
‘Unsupervised’ is the more realistic scenario where no a priori
information is available on the training data.
Finally, for a concrete example, examining flows 6 3, 6 14
and 9 1 under TD, ‘Uniform’ quantization, and a threshold
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Fig. 4. Testing ‘Training Modes’: Semisupervised-Negative, Semisupervised-
Positive and Unsupervised modes, using TD feature and ‘Uniform’ quantiza-
tion method with respect to ‘Hosts’ type of flows. The classifier achieves the
best results of AUC=0.998 with 100% detection and 3.51641% false alarms for
Semisupervised-Negative training mode and the worst results of AUC=0.219
and ∼98% false alarms for 100% detection in case of Semisupervised-Positive
training mode.
of 2.88783x10−12 (obtained from the last test case), we
found that all these flows are classified as anomalies. From
clients point of view, this indicates that clients 6 and 9 are
infected by a Bot program, and form a host perspective this
implies that hosts 1, 3 and 14 act as command and control
servers. By examine these three servers with a list of the
actual domains corresponding to the host our findings were
confirmed. Server 1 is known as ‘hotsearchworld.com’, Server
3 is ‘blitzkrieg88.bl.funpic.de’ and Server 14 has IP address
of 209.123.8.198, which was black-listed.
V. DETECTION OF MALICIOUS TOOLS AND DATA
LEAKAGE
In this section, we include additional results which further
strengthen the applicability of the universal anomaly detec-
tion suggested. Specifically, we apply the anomaly detection
system suggested to system calls in order to detect malicious
tools on a Windows machine, and to TCP traffic of a server in
order to detect unwanted data leakage. In both experiments,
the capability of the tool to detect abnormal behaviour without
prior knowledge is demonstrated.
A. Monitoring the Context of System Calls for Anomalous
Behaviour
The sequence of systems calls used by a process can serve
as an identifier for the process behaviour and use of resources.
Moreover, when a program is exploited or malicious tools are
running, the sequence of system calls may differ significantly
compared to normal behaviour, incriminating the program or
entire machine (see, e.g., [25] and references therein).
In this part of the work, the universal anomaly detection
tool was used to learn the context of normal system calls,
and alert for anomalous behaviour. Specifically, the sequences
of system calls created by a process (e.g., firefox.exe) were
recorder, processed, and learned. Then, when viewing new
data from the same process, the anomaly detection algorithm
compared the processed new data to the learned model in
order to decide whether the process is still benign, or was
it maliciously exploited by some tool.
Due to the large amount of possible system calls, calls
were grouped into 7 types, based on the nature of the call:
Device, Files, Memory, Process, Registry, Security and Syn-
chronization. That is, unlike the time-difference data described
in Section IV, herein, the quantization process did not include
any minimization of distances or a requirement for uniform
probabilities, but, rather, labeled the calls based on their known
functionality. Recording and classification used NtTrace [26].
In the learning phase, system calls were recorder, quantized
according to the types above and then a discrete sequence
over the alphabet of size 7 was created. The sequence was
used to build the (normal behaviour) LZ tree, as described
in Section II, from which a histogram for the probabilities of
tuples of length 20 was calculated. This histogram was the
only data saved from the learning phase. The learning phase
included 4 hours of data.
For testing, segments of 2 minutes were recorded. For each
segment, a histogram was calculated, similar to the learning
phase (calculating probabilities for tuples of length 20 oven
an alphabet of size 7). In this part of the work, decisions
were made based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence (the KL
distance [27, Section 2.3]) between the normal histogram and
the tested one.
Figure 5 plots the KL distance between the histogram during
the learning phase, and the histograms extracted during the
testing phase. The process tested was firefox.exe, and the two
vertical thick lines mark the time when the tool “Zeus” was
active. It is very clear that the context of the system calls
changes dramatically when the tool is active, and that simple
monitoring of the KL distances every few minutes is sufficient
to detect a change in the system behaviour.
B. Identifying Data Leakage
In this part of the work, the universal anomaly detection
algorithm was used in order to identify data leakage from a
TABLE II
DATA LEAKAGE IDENTIFICATION.
Ncat1 Ncat2 Normal1 Normal2 Normal3 Normal4 Normal5 Normal6
MSE 0.962 1.262 0.044 0.153 0.143 0.43 0.142 0.017
KL 2.05 17.163 1.353 1.228 2.026 4.12 2.121 1.396
TABLE III
DATA LEAKAGE IDENTIFICATION WITH ADDITIONAL DOWNLOADS.
Normal Normal + 1.3MB Normal + 10MB Normal + 200MB
Normal 0.906 0.843 0.583 0.72
Ncat 19.05 0.787 0.733 0.353
web server. Specifically, the setting was as follows. In the
learning phase (a period of a few days), benign traffic on a
web server was recorded using Wireshark [28]. Similar to the
previous examples, timing-based sequences where extracted,
quantized and used in order to build an LZ tree. This LZ tree
served as a model for normal data.
Then, using Ncat [29], a script was installed on the server.
This script initiated downloads of large chunks of data from
the server. Several periods, each 30 minutes long, of traffic
which includes Ncat were recorded. For comparison, similar
length periods of traffic without Ncat were recorded as well.
An LZ tree was built for each of the 30 minutes datasets.
To identify data leakage, unlike the Botnets setting con-
sidered in Section IV, in this case, we compared the joint
distributions of k-tuples resulting from the LZ trees. That is,
we used the distribution of k-tuples resulting from the LZ tree
as an identifier for the data set, and calculated the distances
between the distributions.
Table II includes the results. The table depicts the distances
between the learned, normal data, and 8 testing periods, two
which include data leakage using Ncat and 6 without. Two
distance measures where used: Mean Square Error (MSE)
and KL distance. Under MSE, the leakage sessions clearly
stand out compared to normal data. Results under the KL
distance are less clear, especially in the first Ncast session,
which included more normal data than the second.
Finally, to further challenge the algorithm, and see whether
data leakage will also stand out when the normal commu-
nication includes (peaceful) massive downloads, the normal
communication was augmented with benign downloads of
various sizes. Table III depicts the results (under the KL
distance). It is clear that while Ncat stands out compared to
normal traffic on the web server, it is almost indistinguishable
when the normal traffic learned includes downloads of large
files. This is expected, as Ncat uses a similar protocol, and the
key differences in the timing are caused by file sizes. Hence,
data leakage is clearly detected compared to normal surfing,
yet, it is undistinguishable when the server, in peaceful times,
serves large downloads.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some related issues to the
problem in question. First, we discuss what an attacker, the
Botmaster, can do in order to neutralize our solution, and we
show that it is quite complex to do so. Next, we present the
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Fig. 5. KL distances between the learned histogram of normal behavior of firefox.exe and the histograms created every two minutes in the testing phase of
the same process, as a function of time. The two gray vertical lines mark the time when “Zeus” was active.
infinite alphabet problem that exists when using the Lempel-
Ziv compression algorithm as a probability assignment mech-
anism, and suggest another approach for that problem.
A. What Can An Attacker Do?
Remember that the statistical model constructed using the
Lempel-Ziv algorithm is based on previously observed se-
quences, mainly generated by legitimate sources (clients), and
each newly seen sequence is assigned a probability based on
that model. Sequences with probability equal or higher than
a predefined threshold are classified as normal, and otherwise
classified as anomaly.
Accordingly, the attacker may try to build the exact same
model used by our suggested system in order to generate
illegal sequences under the disguise of legitimate ones. For
that matter, the attacker must have an access to the same
database that was used to build the above statistical model.
However, this sensitive information, in most cases, is protected
and not available (that is, the service provider or organization
implementing our system may use large amounts of legitimate
traffic recorded at that organization for the learning process).
Therefore, the attacker’s strategy is to simulate that model,
or only part of it, where no prior knowledge of the underlying
probability distribution of the sources generating the data
sequences is available, by one of the following possibilities.
To be more precise and be able to quantify probabilities
rigorously, we first define the following. Let the underlying
alphabet be a binary alphabet A = {0, 1}, and the length of the
sequences be n. Assume legitimate sequences are generated
i.i.d according to an underlying probability P , which is
unknown, and the attacker generates sequences i.i.d according
to a probability distribution Q, based on some estimate the
attacker generated.
In this case, the attacker may use a trial and error strategy,
and will randomly generate sequences according to probability
distribution Q. Accordingly, the question arises is what is the
probability to accept sequences that were generated according
to Q? To answer this question, we rely on the method of types
[30], where a type PX of a sequence X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn),
xi ∈ A, is defined as the relative proportions of occurrences
of each element from A in X (which is a probability mass
function of X on A). For example, let A = {1, 2, 3} and X =
12123. Accordingly, the type PX is PX(1) = 25 , PX(2) =
2
5 , PX(3) =
1
5 . A type class of PX , denoted as T (PX), is
the set of all sequences of length n and type PX (for a more
complete discussion, see [30]).
Under the above notation, the probability of type class
T (P ) under distribution Qn is 2−nD(P ||Q) to first order
in the exponent, and more precisely, 1
(n+1)|A| 2
−nD(P ||Q) ≤
Qn(T (P )) ≤ 2−nD(P ||Q), where D(P ||Q) is the Kullback-
Leibler Divergence measure (which acts as an error exponent
component for that matter). Consequently, as long as the
attacker does not know P , and uses an estimate Q 6= P , we
have D(P ||Q) > 0, hence the above probability Qn(T (P ))
decays exponentially as n grows to infinity. This means that,
as we use longer sequences (in the testing phase), the attacker
have less chance to bypass and neutralize our suggested
solution with any estimate Q 6= P .
Another attacking approach which needs to be considered
is as follows. The attacker manages to obtain a legitimate
sequence (that exists in the LZ78 phrase-tree) generated ac-
cording to that P , e.g., by simulating/monitoring an HTTP
legitimate connection and extracting the time differences from
that session. First, the attacker may try to use it periodically
by sending an attack sequence with the same pattern of the
above sequence. This method will fail, as repeating a single
sequence over and over again, even if it is legitimate and was
derived from P , will create a stream whose distribution is
far from P . For example, consider a case where one takes a
short sequence, say 001 of unbiased coin tosses, and generates
001001001 . . .. Clearly, the resulting sequence will fail a test
when comparing to an unbiased coin.
A more sophisticated approach is to generate new sequences
based on the above available sequence as presented in [31].
The basic idea is as follows. Given the above legitimate se-
quence, considered as a training sequence and denoted by Xm,
where m is the length of the sequence, and a string of k purely
random bits Uk, which are independent of Xm, the objective
is to generate new sequence(s) of the same length or shorter
(n ≤ m), denoted as Y n, with the same probability distribution
of Xm but with minimum statistical dependency between
these sequences. That is, try to generate new sequences as
if we had the generating source itself. To achieve this goal,
a deterministic function φ(·), independent of the unknown
source P is employed, such that Y n = φ(Xm, Uk), and
minimum mutual information I(Xm;Y n) is required in order
to guarantee weak dependence, as much as possible, between
the given training sequence and the result output sequences.
However, from the results obtained, it follows that in order
to faithfully represent the characteristics of the data, the input
length m must to be as large as possible, and the number of
random bits k needed to guarantee low dependency between
Xm and Y n grows linearly with the output length n.
Considering our problem domain, where the Botmaster
generates new sequences according to the above model and up-
dates its Bots, using the C&C channels, with these sequences
in order to carry out the attack. On the one hand, for the
case where n < m, the Botmaster must constantly produce
and maintain these k random bits (to guarantee low statistical
dependency), resulting in high complexity mechanism, and on
the other hand, for the case where n = m, the Botmaster needs
to generate large sequences (to preserve the characteristics
of the original data, and specifically P ), which may make
it difficult to send these sequences, for example, as email
attachments. Note, one may suggest that instead of receiving
the above sequences through the C&C channels, the Bots
will generate them independently. This is disqualified due to
both complexity (first to obtain a legal sequence and then to
generate new ones, while Bots should operate in a simple
manner as possible) and the requirement of a coordinated
attack.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed a generic, universal anomaly
detection framework. The proposed framework is based on
universal compression and probability assignment, and it is
able to build models for the learned data without any prior
knowledge or model-assumptions. The models can then be
used to detect anomalous behavior and alert in cases of attacks.
Specifically, using universal probability assignment tech-
niques based on the LZ-78 algorithm, we were able to sug-
gest a modeling system which does not require any prior
knowledge on the normal behavior, yet learns its statistical
model optimally, in the sense that it converges to the true
probability assignment whenever the source is stationary and
ergodic. Together with the optimal decision rule, based on the
Neyman-Pearson criteria, the probability assignments result in
robust and efficient detection mechanisms. Moreover, as the
technique suggested is based on practical universal compres-
sion, it can be implemented with low complexity and minimal
pre-processing overhead.
To prove their applicability and test their performance,
we applied the key techniques of this framework to several
problems in computer security. The first was detecting C&C
channels of Botnets. We evaluated the system on real-world
traces. In particular, we offered to use time differences between
events in the network as the key feature, and showed how
the context of such a simple feature, easily learned using the
suggested algorithm, enables the detection of most Botnets in
the data set with a negligible false alarm probability.
We continued with additional applications such as mon-
itoring system calls in order to detect malicious tools and
identifying data leakage. The results for these applications
concurred with our main tests on C&C detection, confirm-
ing the applicability of the suggested framework to several
detection problems. Clearly, additional applications can be
suggested. To name a few, we believe such tools can be used
to identify abnormal behavior of users in computer systems or
abnormalities in large data networks based on traffic patterns
and communication partners of the tested nodes.
REFERENCES
[1] Q. Wang, Z. Chen, and C. Chen, “On the characteristics of the worm
infection family tree,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Trans-
actions on, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 1614–1627, 2012.
[2] W. T. Strayer, D. Lapsely, R. Walsh, and C. Livadas, “Botnet detection
based on network behavior,” in Botnet Detection. Springer, 2008, pp.
1–24.
[3] G. Gu, J. Zhang, and W. Lee, “Botsniffer: Detecting botnet command
and control channels in network traffic,” 2008.
[4] S. Chang and T. E. Daniels, “P2p botnet detection using behavior
clustering & statistical tests,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop
on Security and Artificial Intelligence. ACM, 2009, pp. 23–30.
[5] S.-K. Noh, J.-H. Oh, J.-S. Lee, B.-N. Noh, and H.-C. Jeong, “Detecting
p2p botnets using a multi-phased flow model,” in Digital Society, 2009.
ICDS’09. Third International Conference on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 247–253.
[6] J. Francois, S. Wang, W. Bronzi, R. State, and T. Engel, “Botcloud: de-
tecting botnets using mapreduce,” in Information Forensics and Security
(WIFS), 2011 IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–6.
[7] R. Villamarı´n-Salomo´n and J. C. Brustoloni, “Identifying botnets using
anomaly detection techniques applied to dns traffic,” in Consumer
Communications and Networking Conference, 2008. CCNC 2008. 5th
IEEE. IEEE, 2008, pp. 476–481.
[8] P. Burghouwt, M. Spruit, and H. Sips, “Towards detection of botnet
communication through social media by monitoring user activity,” in
Information Systems Security. Springer, 2011, pp. 131–143.
[9] S. Shin, G. Gu, N. Reddy, and C. P. Lee, “A large-scale empirical study
of conficker,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 676–690, 2012.
[10] S. S. Silva, R. M. Silva, R. C. Pinto, and R. M. Salles, “Botnets: A
survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 378–403, 2013.
[11] F. H. Abbasi, R. J. Harris, G. Moretti, A. Haider, and N. Anwar,
“Classification of malicious network streams using honeynets,” in Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2012 IEEE. IEEE, 2012,
pp. 891–897.
[12] M. Celenk, T. Conley, J. Willis, and J. Graham, “Predictive network
anomaly detection and visualization,” Information Forensics and Secu-
rity, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 288–299, 2010.
[13] G. Gu, R. Perdisci, J. Zhang, W. Lee et al., “Botminer: Clustering
analysis of network traffic for protocol-and structure-independent botnet
detection.” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2008, pp. 139–154.
[14] B. AsSadhan, J. M. Moura, D. Lapsley, C. Jones, and W. T. Strayer,
“Detecting botnets using command and control traffic,” in Network Com-
puting and Applications, 2009. NCA 2009. Eighth IEEE International
Symposium on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 156–162.
[15] F. Tegeler, X. Fu, G. Vigna, and C. Kruegel, “Botfinder: Finding bots in
network traffic without deep packet inspection,” in Proceedings of the
8th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and
technologies. ACM, 2012, pp. 349–360.
[16] W. Lu, M. Tavallaee, G. Rammidi, and A. A. Ghorbani, “Botcop: An
online botnet traffic classifier,” in Communication Networks and Services
Research Conference, 2009. CNSR’09. Seventh Annual. IEEE, 2009,
pp. 70–77.
[17] A. Este, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli, “Support vector machines for tcp
traffic classification,” Computer Networks, vol. 53, no. 14, pp. 2476–
2490, 2009.
[18] C. Mazzariello and C. Sansone, “Anomaly-based detection of irc botnets
by means of one-class support vector classifiers,” in Image Analysis and
Processing–ICIAP 2009. Springer, 2009, pp. 883–892.
[19] S. Siboni and A. Cohen, “Botnet identification via universal anomaly
detection,” in Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2014 IEEE
International Workshop on, Dec 2014, pp. 101–106.
[20] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection: A survey,”
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 41, no. 3, p. 15, 2009.
[21] M. Feder, N. Merhav, and M. Gutman, “Universal prediction of indi-
vidual sequences,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 38,
no. 4, pp. 1258–1270, 1992.
[22] J. Ziv and A. Lempel, “Compression of individual sequences via
variable-rate coding,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 530–536, 1978.
[23] M. Nisenson, I. Yariv, R. El-Yaniv, and R. Meir, “Towards behaviometric
security systems: Learning to identify a typist,” in Knowledge Discovery
in Databases: PKDD 2003. Springer, 2003, pp. 363–374.
[24] R. Begleiter, R. El-Yaniv, and G. Yona, “On prediction using variable
order markov models,” J. Artif. Intell. Res.(JAIR), vol. 22, pp. 385–421,
2004.
[25] D. S. Fava, S. R. Byers, and S. J. Yang, “Projecting cyberattacks through
variable-length markov models,” Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 359–369, 2008.
[26] NtTrace - native API tracing for Windows. [Online]. Available:
http://www.howzatt.demon.co.uk/NtTrace/
[27] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. John
Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[28] Wireshark. [Online]. Available: https://www.wireshark.org/
[29] Ncat. [Online]. Available: http://nmap.org/ncat/guide/
[30] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. John
Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[31] N. Merhav and M. J. Weinberger, “On universal simulation of informa-
tion sources using training data,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 5–20, 2004.
